Page first published on March 16, 2022
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This site dates back to the end of the last century—rather old, in fact. When I created it, I intended to discuss science and philosophy, specifically space missions on the one hand, and philosophical reflections between East and West on the other. But something quickly happened that significantly changed its focus, prompting me to create a section on politics, or perhaps better, geopolitics: the outbreak of the first real war in Europe in a long time. It was 1999: NATO waged war on Serbia—then still known as Yugoslavia, though now reduced to just Serbia and Montenegro—to support Kosovo separatists against the Belgrade government, which was accused of unacceptable behavior toward ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
NATO attacked Yugoslavia, subjecting it to a massive air offensive, in support of the Kosovar rebels' actions on the ground. That was the first war between nations in Europe since World War II. Of course, the disintegration of Yugoslavia had already sparked a bloody conflict between the various parts of the former federation, even leading to foreign intervention. However, the latter, at least in the deployment of military forces, had been limited to interposition between the warring parties, all of which were within the former Yugoslav federation. In 1999, NATO launched a military attack on Serbia, though the direct intervention was only airborne. But it was bloody: Serbia was extensively bombed, destroying civilian infrastructure and resulting in thousands of casualties. These issues are covered extensively in the pages written at the time, and I will not dwell on them further.
Now, in March 2022, Russia has invaded Ukraine. Many are only now talking about a "war in Europe," but I want to emphasize that the war in Europe dates back to the 1990s. If we're talking about armed conflicts within a crumbling state, it's with the events in Bosnia; if we're talking about wars between nations (like the current one), it's with the NATO attack on Serbia in 1999.
The conflict in Ukraine actually dates back to 2014, when a coup ousted pro-Russian President Yanukovych and replaced him with a pro-Western government. Russia responded by seizing Crimea and supporting the independence uprising in the Donbass region.
The conflict remained latent but never abated throughout these years. The most heated phase was halted by the Minsk agreements, which, however, remained largely unimplemented, resulting in mutual accusations between the parties and a low-intensity conflict that never subsided.
Now, in an unexpected and unjustifiable move, Russia has invaded Ukraine. Its objectives aren't entirely clear, but its motivations are; I'll explain them later.
In 1999, I was so shocked by the outbreak of a conflict between nations in Europe that I began commenting on it in real time, even delving into the details of the situation. I don't intend to do the same today; there is abundant commentary and information (the value of which I won't go into). I'll simply offer a few reflections on the parallels with other wars and on war in general.
top of pageRussian aggression against Ukraine is unjustifiable, no matter how you look at it. Some point out that, according to the principles used in the Nuremberg Trials, a war of aggression is the first and greatest war crime, because it determines all the others. Moreover, the principle was enunciated by the Russian judge. President Putin is therefore committing a crime.
But I cannot forget that the same crime Putin is now committing was committed by all NATO leaders in 1999 (Clinton, Chirac, Schroeder, D'Alema, and others). In the Italian case, there was also a violation of the Constitution, which explicitly prohibits the use of war to resolve international disputes, effectively permitting only defensive warfare—and wasn't that the case then, or is anyone capable of saying that Serbia was attacking Italy? Putin claims to be attacking Ukraine to defend the Russian-speaking population, while NATO in 1999 claimed to be attacking Serbia to defend the ethnic Albanian population. Both are completely inadequate justifications, given an act of enormous violence that has resulted in thousands of victims, including among the very population it purports to defend.
Without going back in time, but only forward from 1999, there were the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, both launched as direct attacks on nations that were not attacking anyone. Afghanistan had hosted Osama bin Laden, but there is no evidence that he participated in the terrorist attacks of 2001. But the case of Iraq was absolutely unacceptable, as it was accused of "having weapons of mass destruction"—but how can you attack someone simply because you think they possess dangerous weapons? Not only was there no offensive use of them, but there wasn't even a threat. It was later discovered that those weapons didn't exist, and that the alleged evidence of their existence was false. Thus, in the case of Iraq, the crime of aggressive war was aggravated by the preliminary crime of fabricating false evidence to justify it. Therefore, the then-US president, George W. Bush, was guilty of the same crime as Putin, like his predecessor Clinton, but under even more serious circumstances.
I'd also like to say a few words about the conflict in Yemen, which has already caused hundreds of thousands of deaths, including with weapons manufactured in Italy. How can we say that the Saudi regime, which has been massacring Yemenis for years, is less bloodthirsty than the Russian one?
A war of aggression is always a crime; no justification, whether true or false, will hold water, let alone a false one. Faced with the systematic actions of the US, NATO, and European countries, Putin is no more criminal than Clinton, Bush, and company. Putin can easily claim he's doing something essentially similar to what NATO did in 1999: militarily intervening against a sovereign country to protect its internal minority. A completely inadequate justification, today as then.
top of pageWar is a horror that must be avoided at all costs. If we examine the practices of various nations, justifications for waging it have always been found, but the truth is that the cause of war lies in the minds of men (more rarely women) in power, not just heads of state, of course. Power usually rests with those who pursue it and are willing to do everything possible to obtain it. Only circumstances and awareness of the possible consequences limit them and prevent constant and unstoppable violence. Since the advent of industrialized warfare, that is, since the First World War, the other factor has been the interests of the arms industry. I have addressed this topic in two articles on this site.
In general, I see in American propaganda, unfortunately believed by many, the grotesquely simplistic theory that bad guys commit crimes because they're bad, and all we can do is kill them. You might call it the Hollywood theory about the origins of violence. It's constantly instilled in us by the entertainment industry, in a thousand ways. It's also important to note that the amount of violence contained in American-style film and television is terrifying.
Instead, let's try to understand how violence came about, because if we don't understand how things happen, we only lay the groundwork for the next war. The truth is that no one is evil by nature, and every action has causes and motivations.
What's striking about the Russian attack on Ukraine is certainly its astonishing level of recklessness. Even those accustomed to thinking in geopolitical terms, based on national interest and the pursuit of power, have difficulty understanding the immediate motivations behind this action, but the underlying reasons aren't so difficult to grasp.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union was not foreseen by many, and it certainly isn't the place to analyze it here. However, it should be noted that immediately after it, there was a period of time in which Russia could have entered a new world system of peace and cooperation. I always remember the conversation I had with a Russian man on a long car ride. He was happy to practice his Italian, which he knew very well, and we chatted about this and that. The Soviet Union had recently fallen. He explained to me that most Russians believed that, once freed from the Soviet regime, they would soon be able to enjoy a standard of living comparable to that of America and the West in general. They no longer believed Soviet propaganda, to the point that they believed the images of homeless Americans shown on TV were a fabrication. Only after credible reports began to arrive did they discover that homeless people in America actually existed.
The dream was quickly shattered: Yeltsin's government, influenced by Western advisors, embarked on an ultra-liberal policy that led to widespread poverty, unimaginable in the Soviet era. Power fell into the hands of a small group of oligarchs (former Soviet officials) who, now freed from the need to formally adhere to socialist principles, seized all the country's wealth, facilitated by the reckless deregulation approved by Western advisors.
This system could not sustain itself for long, the oligarchs fought among themselves and eventually a leader emerged who had the ability to manage this type of power struggle and also a greater intelligence base, which led him to understand that he had to guarantee the survival of the state so that there was any power whatsoever to defend: that was Putin.
The late 1990s were a turning point. Russia was prostrate, and Putin would have been ready to establish a stable cooperative relationship with the West—well, with America and its subjects, to express the true balance of power. He even seriously considered joining NATO. But America found itself in crisis for very different reasons: the ruling elite, deprived of its historic adversary, had difficulty justifying its extremely expensive military machine and saw the risk of losing its global dominance for the obvious reason that, if Russia joined the Western bloc, the non-American component would acquire excessive weight, shifting the balance of power toward the Old Continent. Although weakened, Russia was too large to join NATO without unbalancing it.
Thus, a large segment of the American elite did everything it could to reject cooperation with Russia and turn it back into an enemy. Russia could only join NATO piecemeal. First, it welcomed the former Warsaw Pact states, then the Baltic republics, gradually moving towards the acquisition of former Soviet republics that were historically part of the Russian Empire: from Georgia to Ukraine.
From the Russian perspective, a plan for its own dissolution was clearly discernible. There are certainly many within the American elite and in Eastern Europe who desire the end of Russia as we know it; this is a fact that is not lost on the Moscow government.
Like it or not, Ukraine has always been part of Russia. Anyone who denies this is just propagandizing and denying history. Those who accuse Putin of fabricating history are simply ridiculous. The events of 2014, which caused Moscow to lose influence over Ukraine, marked the crossing of the red line, leading to the first violent reaction: the annexation of Crimea and support for an independence movement in the eastern provinces.
Had Ukraine joined NATO, the grave consequences for Russia would have been the permanent loss of historically Russian lands and the possibility of having missiles pointed at Moscow from a distance of just a few hundred kilometers. The reckless decision to attack now was likely driven by the perception that America was not so determined to defend it—which it is, after all—and the risk that any possibility of bringing Ukraine back under its influence would soon become impossible.
An uncertain American leadership, a deeply internally divided America, perhaps gave the impression of a unique opportunity. But on the things that really matter, the American elite, even when engaged in internal struggles, never loosens its grip. And it has left the bulk of the response to its European allies.
Another mistake by Putin, a truly egregious one if true, which may have been decisive in leading to the direct attack, was perhaps the belief that Ukraine would immediately surrender, pushed by the pro-Russian elements within it. The Russian army would be seen as a liberator and welcomed by cheering masses of ethnic Russian Ukrainians. It may sound absurd, but what if that was exactly what Moscow (and not just Putin, but those in power in general) thought?
In short, the Russian elite feared a threat to its very existence, saw a window of opportunity that could be closed, and believed the matter could be easily resolved by acting immediately. Hence the decision to unleash an open war.
top of pagePutin seems determined to see it through, continuing the invasion until he achieves all his objectives. After all, he's now a prisoner of his own actions: those who start a war generally don't know how to end it, because the initial plan is usually the first casualty of the conflict. We've explained the strategic motivations, but the tactical objective of Putin and his supporters isn't even entirely clear—unless, of course, they were thinking of Ukraine's rapid surrender, prisoners of their own propaganda.
Zelensky, for his part, has no intention of giving up and wants to see it through until someone finally comes to his rescue. For now, America and Europe are limiting themselves to providing him with some assistance to get by, not wanting to clash directly with Russia without sanctions.
Furthermore, these latter factors, combined with the very circumstances of the conflict, are seriously damaging Europe, while leaving America immune from immediate consequences. Europe depends on Russia for its gas supply, which is essential for electricity generation, home heating, and industry. While it's easy to change oil suppliers, regardless of the price involved, gas arrives primarily via pipelines, directly from the extraction areas, and therefore its market is very rigid. To ship it in, regasification plants are needed, which in Italy, for example, are insufficient, as their construction is constantly halted by anti-government committees; see my article on this topic .
Russia and Ukraine are also among the world's leading suppliers of wheat and grains, and this too is becoming a very serious problem. Furthermore, Ukraine is a major producer of neon, essential for the electronics industry, and auto components. Various industrial sectors will find themselves forced to change suppliers, with significant price increases, or slow down production.
The conditions are therefore ripe for a protracted conflict. Russia, for example, may believe that sanctions and the halt to Ukrainian exports will have a more serious impact on its enemies than on itself. It's impossible to make predictions.
Of course, to limit the suffering of the population, a ceasefire should be reached as soon as possible, but how can this be achieved? Clearly, a mediator is missing. Considering the attitude of the parties, the situation is truly complicated: forcing Ukraine to surrender would mean allying with Russia, while forcing Russia to stop is something no one dares to do. Or rather, they're trying with sanctions, but for now it doesn't seem to work and in the long run could actually harm those who impose them. The United States and Europe have chosen a dead-end path: their hostility toward Russia, violent in words but impotent in action, only serves to reinforce Putin's belief that he has no alternative but to follow through. He can bring Europe to its knees whenever he wants by turning off the gas supply, even if this step would cost him economic ruin. However, with sanctions that are ruining him anyway, he is being tempted to resort to this last resort: when he finds himself truly in trouble, what would stop him from turning off the gas supply and sabotaging the facilities as well?
Not to mention the specter of a possible use of nuclear weapons, of which Russia has plenty.
Certainly, whoever succeeds in taking the power away from weapons and restoring it to dialogue will gain immense prestige before the world. China is likely missing another fabulous opportunity to acquire the "soft power" it has always lacked: it is perhaps the only nation that can truly stand in the way, possessing real power over Russia. Its possible shift to the anti-Russian front would be disastrous for Putin. It can also position itself as a credible interlocutor with Ukraine, providing guarantees that America and Europe, now established as Russia's enemies, cannot provide except in terms of a truncated alliance, because they are unwilling and unable to fight. China, having positioned itself as a neutral and potential supporter of Russia, now has a very powerful weapon of pressure on Russia: the threat of leaving it alone against the entire world.
Unfortunately, China's leadership appears to lack the qualities necessary for those who would like to be an alternative to American global hegemony. Chinese leaders are authoritarian and devoid of any vision beyond crude violence against their own people. Just look at how they treat minorities within China itself: they view them as a threat to the country's unity, failing to understand that they are actually a resource for its expansion. They persecute the Uyghurs, failing to understand that they are the bridge to the vast world of Turkic language and culture. They seek to destroy Tibetan culture, failing to understand that with its help they could gain immense influence in the West as well as in Asia.
If you aim for global power, you must have the tools to assume a leadership role with peoples and civilizations other than your own, a capability that China absolutely lacks, unlike America. I must say that the political shortsightedness of the Chinese leadership borders on the incredible.
What can be done concretely is to help the refugees, send humanitarian aid (not mixed with weapons) to Ukraine, and support every attempt at mediation. Israel and Turkey don't have much leverage to exert on Russia, but they have already offered to act as mediators. Let's hope they, or someone else, succeed.
Alberto Cavallo - March 16, 2022
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